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Stock bonus and employee stock ownership plans are among the
several types of employee deferred compensation programs that can
qualify for special tax status under the Internal Revenue Code.' These
plans benefit the national economy by affording corporate employees
an equity interest in the employer's business, thus creating new incen-
tives for employee efficiency and productivity. The plans expand the
ownership of income-producing capital, helping to avoid increased
concentration of wealth, and they benefit employees by furnishing
them with a valuable second income source in addition to wages.2
Largely for these reasons, Congress has consistently granted such plans
favorable tax treatment,3 particularly in the recent pension reform
act, known officially as the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).4
Qualified stock bonus and employee stock ownership plans have a
multitude of uses, in both publicly held and closely held corpora-
l. A trust forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan that qualifies
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a), is exempt from income taxation by virtue of INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(a). Special treatment applies both in the taxation of the trust
beneficiaries and in the employer's deduction of contributions to these trusts. See INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402, 404(a).
At the present time pension and profit-sharing plans far outnumber stock bonus (or
employee stock ownership) plans. Williams, Stock Bonus Plans-An Undiscovered Pos-
sibility in the Internal Revenue Code for Closely Held Corporations, 1 J. CORP. TAx. 409
(1975).
2. For an example of the potential incentives and employee benefits that employee
stock ownership may bring, see Profit Sharing: Lowe's Largesse, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31,
1975, at 61.
3. In several recent statutes Congress has encouraged the implementation of qualified
employee stock ownership plans. See Regional Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973, §
206(e)(3), 45 U.S.C.A. § 716(e)(3) (Supp. 1975); Trade Act of 1974, § 273(f), 88 Stat. 1978(1975); Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301(d) (Mar. 29, 1975). Sen.
Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, strongly advocates measures to foster
employee stock ownership. See 119 CONG. REC. S22548-52 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1973); 121
CONG. REC. S4223-24 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1975). Sen. Long has predicted that the result of
greater employee stock ownership "will be a major change for the better in the American
economy." 121 CoNe. REC. S5245 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1975).
4. 88 Stat. 829. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a),
and the relevant Treasury regulations provided qualified status for "stock bonus" plans.
ERISA and the amendments to the Internal Revenue Code therein continue to use the
term ",stock bonus" plan while introducing the hybrid "employee stock ownership" plan,
which is a stock bonus plan "designed to invest primarily in qualifying employee [sic]
hecurities." See ERISA § 407(d)(6), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107(d)(6) (Supp. 1975); ERISA § 2003(a),
amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(e)(7). This Note uses the term "ESOT" (em-
ployee stock ownership trust) to refer to the trust through which both types of plans
are operated.
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tions. 5 In close corporations, however, establishing an employee stock
ownership trust (ESOT) to hold the assets of and administer the plan
for the employees carries the extra virtue of serving the estate planning
needs of the close corporation's shareholders. The shareholders can sell
their stock to the ESOT and avoid most of the principal problems
surrounding traditional means for the disposition of close corporation
stock. In addition to employee benefits, the ESOT thus provides an
in-house stock market through which the closely held corporation can
fund the purchase of its outstanding shares on attractive terms.
This Note examines the use of ESOT's as a vehicle for estate plan-
ning in closely held corporations, pointing out the potential advan-
tages of the ESOT purchase over traditional arrangements for the dis-
position of close corporation stock. It then considers some problem
areas in the use of the ESOT as an estate planning device, and at-
tempts to resolve the issues in a manner consistent with the underlying
purposes of qualified stock bonus and employee stock ownership plans.
I. The ESOT Purchase Arrangement for the Disposition
of Close Corporation Stock
A. Mechanics of the ESOT Purchase Transaction
A stock bonus or employee stock ownership plan is an employee
compensation program, established and maintained by an employer cor-
poration, which distributes benefits in stock of the employer company."
A trustee designated by the employer holds the assets of and adminis-
ters the plan under a stock bonus or employee stock ownership trust.
If it qualifies under Internal Revenue Code § 401(a), the trust is ex-
empt from income taxation.7
In order to qualify under Internal Revenue Code § 401(a), a stock
5. Louis Kelso, a lawyer and economist, explored the many potential impacts and
uses of these plans. See L. KELso & M. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 190-91 (1958);
L. KELSO & P. HEaqTR, How To TURN EIGHTY MILLION WORKERS INTO CAPITALISTS ON
BoRRoWsED MONEY 82-89 (1967). The approach is a manifestation of Kelso's theory for
expanding the ownership of capital. Stock bonus or employee stock ownership plans are
sometimes called "Kelso plans." See generally Blackman, Employee Stock Bonus Plans: An
Overlooked But Good Vay to Provide Executive Compensation, 12 TAx. FOR ACCOUNTANTS
276 (1974); Bushman, The Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 113 TRUsrs & Esr. 580(1974); Menke, The Employee Stock Ownership Trust: A New Trend in Employee
Benefits and Corporate Finance, 29 J. Am. Soc'Y C.L.U. 31 (1975); Miller, Buying Closely
Held Stock With Tax Deductible Dollars, 29 J. Am. Soc'Y C.L.U. 8 (1975); Miller &
Williams, Stock Bonus Plans Have Enhanced Utility in Light of the Pension Reform
Laws, 42 J. TAx. 87 (1975); Reade, ESOT Spells a New Employee Benefit, PENS. & WELF.
NEWS, Apr. 1974, at 49; Williams, supra note 1; Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans:
A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55 B.U.L. REV. 195 (1975).
6. Treas. Reg. §§ 1A01-1(a)(2)(iii), (b)(1)(iii) (1956). See note 4 supra.
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(a).
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bonus plan must meet certain requirements relating to coverage,8 dis-
crimination,' and vesting.10 It must be communicated to the em-
ployees, 1 and be established and operated for the exclusive benefit
of the employees.' 2 There can be no reversion of trust assets or diver-
sion for purposes other than the exclusive benefit of employees. 13
The plan provisions' 4 state the criteria for employer contributions,
which may be made according to the employer's discretion if the plan
so provides.'3 The employer corporation can annually deduct contri-
butions not in excess of 15 percent of the total compensation otherwise
paid or accrued during the taxable year to the employees covered by
the stock bonus plan.' 6
Contributions to the stock bonus plan are allocated to individual
employee accounts and benefits are distributed to the covered em-
ployees or their beneficiaries according to a definite predetermined
formula, as in a profit-sharing plan.' 7 Stock bonus plans are generally
comparable to profit-sharing plans, except that contributions to stock
bonus plans do not depend necessarily upon the existence of profits'8
and benefits are distributable only in stock of the employer.' 9 The
8. See ERISA § 1011, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 410(b).
9. Neither contributions to nor benefits from a qualified plan may discriminate in
favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or are highly compensated. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(4). However, a plan will not be considered discriminatory if con-
tributions on behalf of individual covered employees are made proportional to their
compensation. Id. § 401(a)(5).
10. ERISA § 1012, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 411(a)(2) (minimum vesting standards).
But ci. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301(d)(4) (Mar. 29, 1975) (full and
immediate vesting required in connection with contributions that qualify corporation for
elective 11 percent investment credit).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (1956).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(2).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3)(iv) (1956); Rev. Rul. 149, 1971-1 Cum. BULL. 118. The
exclusive-benefit-of-employees rule serves as a limiting principle in all transactions in-
volving the ESOT.
14. The plan provisions, along with certain other information, must be filed with the
Internal Revenue Service. See Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-2 (1956).
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1956). The regulations controlling profit-sharing
plans are generally applicable to stock bonus plans. See id. § 1.401-1(a)(2)(iii) (1956).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(3). However, the overall percentage limitation for
the employer's deductible contributions to combination pension, retirement annuity, and
stock bonus plans is expanded to 25 percent of covered employee compensation. Id.,§
404(a)(7). There are carryover provisions with respect to contributions both above and
below the 15 percent limit. Id. § 404(a)(3). The annual additions (including those due
to forfeitures by other participants of their unvested interests) to an individual's account
may not exceed the lesser of $25,000 or 25 percent of the individual's other compensa-
tion. ERISA § 2004, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 415(c)(1), (f)(1)(B).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (1956).
18. Id. § 1AOl-l(a)(2)(iii) (1956).
19. Id.; Rev. Rul. 195, 1962-2 Cuss. BULL. 125; Rev. Rul. 256, 1971-1 Cum. BULL. 118.
The regulations and these rulings may require the ESOT to purchase additional em-
ployer stock with any investment income it receives. The ESOT, however, might be able
to distribute such investment income (for example, cash dividends paid upon employer
stock) in cash or property other than employer stock. The law on this point is not clear.
See Note, supra note 35, at 208 n.76.
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covered employees or their beneficiaries are not taxed with respect to
these benefits until the trust actually distributes stock to them.2 0
The employer corporation's contributions to the trust usually con-
sist of cash or employer stock, although the employer may contribute
certain other property.21 There are no explicit limitations upon the
assets the trust may hold,22 except that any employer securities or real
property held must be "qualifying" assets.2 3 Since the trust can dis-
tribute benefits only in the form of employer stock, however, the trust
must acquire employer stock prior to the time of distribution to the
participating employees or their beneficiaries. When trust funds are
invested in employer stock, the trustee must make full disclosure con-
cerning the investment so that the Internal Revenue Service can de-
termine whether the trust violates the exclusive-benefit-of-employees
rule.24
The trust's acquisition of any property from a "party in interest"
(which includes the employer corporation, its employees, officers and
directors, and shareholders owning, directly or indirectly, 10 percent
or more of the employer or the trust)2  generally is a prohibited trans-
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(l) (1956). See ERISA
§ 2005(a), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(e) (preferential treatment of lump sum distribu-
tions).
The trust must distribute benefits to an employee within 60 days after the close of
the plan year in which the latest of the following events occurs: (i) the employee reaches
65, or an earlier retirement age specified in the plan; (ii) his completion of 10 years of
plan participation; or (iii) his termination of employment. ERISA § 1021(a)(2)(d), INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(14). The ESOT may (if the terms of the stock bonus plan
so provide) distribute stock after a fixed number of years, which has been interpreted to
mean at least two years, Rev. Rul. 295, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 184, or upon the prior oc-
currence of some event (e.g., retirement, death, layoff, disability). See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1
(b)(1)(ii) (1956). "Some event" also can mean the completion of a period of participation
in the plan or the attainment of a stated age. Rev. Rul. 24, 1968-1 Cumt. BULL. 150.
21. See Long, Investing Trust Fund Assets in the Employer's Own Stock, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 23, 37-40 (1972).
22. The plan fiduciary generally must adhere to the prudence and diversification
requirements of ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(B), (C), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ l104(a)(1)(B), (C) (Supp. 1975),
in investing trust assets.
23. ERISA § 407(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107(a)(1) (Supp. 1975). The diversification re-
quirements of ERISA §§ 404(a)(l)(B), (C), are not violated by the acquisition or holding
of such qualifying assets. ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(2) (Supp. 1975).
The acquisition and holding of employer stock do not violate the "prudent man" rule,
which must be applied "bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans." H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974). But cf. Note, supra
note 5, at 215-16. This is consistent with the position taken by the Internal Revenue
Service under the prior law. See Rev. Rul. 65, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 114, 115 ("fair return"
test held inapplicable to stock bonus plan); Rev. Rul. 421, 1969-2 Cot. BULL. 59, 65.
Rev. Rul. 65 acknowledged the special purpose of the stock bonus plan "to give the
employee-participants an interest in the ownership and growth of the employer's
business."
In addition, the 10 percent limitation with respect to acquisition and holding of
qualifying employer securities and real property does not apply to "eligible individual
account" plans (e.g., stock bonus and employee stock ownership plans). ERISA §§ 407
(b)(1), (d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1107(b)(1), (d)(3)(A) (Supp. 1975).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(ii) (1956); Rev. Rul. 421, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 59, 65.
25. ERISA §§ 3(14)(C), (H), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(14)(C), (H) (Supp. 1975).
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action. 20 ERISA § 408(e),27 however, provides an exception for "eligible
individual account plans" (a term which includes stock bonus and
employee stock ownership plans).28 These plans may acquire "qualify-
ing employer securities" (for example, employer stock) 29 from parties
in interest if the acquisition is for adequate consideration 0 and no
commission is charged.31 Because of the ESOT's ability to purchase
stock of the employer corporation at fair market value from the pre-
existing shareholders,3 2 the close corporation's establishment of a stock
bonus or employee stock ownership plan creates an in-house market
for its stock.
The basic ESOT purchase arrangement proceeds as follows: the
corporation establishes a stock bonus or employee stock ownership
plan for its employees, and makes tax-deductible cash contributions
to the ESOT which administers the plan. The ESOT purchases stock
from the existing shareholder or shareholders at an arm's length price
(as determined by outside appraisal), and allocates the purchased shares
among the accounts of the covered employees. The interests of the in-
dividual employees vest in accordance with a specific schedule, and
upon an employee's retirement, death, or other events specified in
the plan, the ESOT distributes the vested shares to the employee or
his beneficiary, at which time the recipient is taxed with respect to
the stock received.
26. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1l06(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1975).
27. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(e) (Supp. 1975). See ERISA § 2003(a), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 4975(d)(13) (penalty tax on prohibited transactions inapplicable to transactions exempt'
under ERISA § 408(e)).
28. ERISA § 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107(d)(3) (Supp. 1975).
29. ERISA § 407(d)(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107(d)(5) (Supp. 1975). "Individual account
plans" are generally those in which the employees may choose their own investments. See
H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 305-06 (1974). However, in a stock bonus or
employee stock ownership plan, which is designed to invest in employer stock, by def-
inition there can be no employee control over investments. Such plans are, nonethe-
less, included within the definition of "eligible individual account plans."
30. See ERISA § 3(18), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(18) (Supp. 1975) (defining "adequate con-
sideration" with respect to unlisted securities as fair market value as determined in
good faith by the trustee).
31. The Internal Revenue Service took the position before the enactment of ERISA
that the exclusive-benefit-of-employees rule did not prevent the seller from deriving
some benefit from a transaction with the trust-for instance, the trust's purchase of
securities at fair market value was permissible even though the seller sold at a profit.
Rev. Rul. 421, 1969-2 Cus,. BULL. 59, 65. ERISA § 408(e), which expressly approves trust
acquisitions from parties in interest, codifies this approach.
32. The Conference Report on ERISA clearly indicates that Congress intended that
such purchases be permitted. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 312-13, 318
(1974).
Although Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1956) provides that a plan "so designed as to
amount to a subterfuge for the distribution of profits to shareholders" will not
qualify under the exclusive-benefit-of-employees rule, the regulation cannot be read to
disqualify plans on the basis of transactions protected by ERISA provisions. The regula-
tions promulgated under the former law must be read in light of ERISA and the con-
gressional policies embodied therein.
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The basic ESOT purchase arrangement is subject to many possible
variations.3 The ESOT can gradually acquire stock from the pre-
existing shareholders as it receives cash contributions from the cor-
poration, or it can purchase stock when it is available, as on a share-
holder's death or retirement. In the interim, the trust could make tem-
porary income-producing investments with the cash contributions re-
ceived, possibly purchasing insurance on the life of the selling share-
holder to provide sufficient cash for a purchase from his estate.34 The
ESOT might enter a mandatory agreement (on terms favorable to the
employees) requiring it to purchase and the shareholder to sell stock
at his death, disability, or retirement, although such an agreement
should generally be unnecessary.35
An important variation from the basic ESOT purchase arrangement
uses the corporation's credit in a leveraged purchase on behalf of a
stock bonus or employee stock ownership plan.36 The ESOT obtains
funds for the stock purchase from an outside lender in exchange for
a promissory note secured by both the ESOT's pledge of the purchased
stock and the corporation's guarantee of the ESOT's note.37 The
ESOT uses the loan funds to purchase a block of outstanding stock'
from the present shareholders, and the corporation makes annual tax-
33. For descriptions of possible uses of the ESOT concept see sources cited in note 5
supra.
34. Blackman, supra note 5, at 280. But see Miller, supra note 5, at 12-13 (commenting
on past IRS objections to such insurance purchases by ESOT's).
35. The ESOT should always be a willing buyer, since it can distribute benefits only
in stock of the employer corporation. If a willing buyer must be guaranteed, a mandatory
future purchase agreement negotiated at arm's length and in good faith by a party in
interest and the ESOT trustee might be within the ERISA § 408(e) exception. But the
trustee risks a subsequent finding that his entering into such an agreement violated
ERISA § 406(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(b)(2) (Supp. 1975) (fiduciary prohibited from enter-
ing any transaction adverse to the interests of the plan) if, for instance, the agreement
price exceeds the stock's fair market value at the time of the required purchase.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 312-13 (1974).
37. Of course, a lender will always demand the corporation's guarantee since it relies
on the credit of the corporation, not the ESOT. If the lender is a party in interest, the
ESOT can give only qualifying employer securities as collateral. ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29
U.S.C.A. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. 1975). If the transaction is structured so that the corporation
promises to make certain future employee compensation payments to the ESOT, and the
ESOT then assigns its rights under the contract to an outside lender (who is not a party
in interest), the obligation to make future employee compensation payments need not
appear as a liability on the corporation's balance sheet. Cf. T. FIFLIS & H. KRIPKE, AC-
COUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 505-07 (1971) (discussion of off-balance sheet financing by
means of forward-purchase contracts).
The corporation's guarantee of the ESOT's note might be recast by the Internal
Revenue Service as a direct loan to the corporation followed by the corporation's contribu-
tion of the entire loan funds to the ESOT. See Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner,
462 F.2d 712, 723-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972). But such a characteriza-
tion would present no problems: the amount of the corporation's tax deductions would be
unchanged since it could deduct under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a), the interest
payments attributed to it and could deduct gradually the ESOT contribution under the
carryover provision of id. § 404(a)(3). Repayment of the note by the ESOT would not be
a prohibited transaction. See ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § I108(b)(3) (Supp. 1975).
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deductible contributions to the trust sufficient to permit the trust to
amortize the loan obligation. The lender then releases shares from the
pledge as the ESOT pays off the note. A related variation is also pos-
sible. If the selling shareholder does not require immediate cash, he
might take purchase-money notes from ESOT 38 in exchange for his
stock in a leveraged transaction that does not involve an outside
lender.39
Since 1953 the IRS has explicitly authorized borrowing by employee
benefit trusts for the purchase of investments. 40 In 1971 this authori-
zation was extended to a trust's borrowing funds for investment in
employer securities.41 The new pension reform law specifically ap-
proves leveraged purchases of outstanding shares from existing share-
holders. ERISA § 408(b)(3) 42 permits borrowing at a reasonable interest
rate by employee stock ownership plans for the purchase of qualifying
employer securities if the loan is primarily for the participants' benefit
even when the lender is a party in interest. The Conference Re-
port makes it clear that Congress specifically approves the "common
practice" of leveragcd purchases of stock by these plans from major
shareholders. 43 Such leveraged purchases, however, are subject to spe-
38. The income realized could be reported on an installment basis. See INT. REv. CODE
oF 1954, § 453; cf. Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. But see note 43 infra.
40. Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 287.
41. Rev. Rul. 311, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 184, 185, states:
The borrowing of funds by a trust and investing them in the securities of, or enter-
ing into transactions with, the employer or an entity closely related to the employer
do not disqualify a trust as one for the exclusive benefit of employees unless the
borrowing is undertaken for the purpose of benefiting the employer as, for example,
borrowing in order to furnish capital or property for use in the employer's business
at a time when the employer's financial condition is such that it is unable to borrow
money from usual financial sources.
42. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(b)(3) (Supp. 1975).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 312-13 (1974). The ERISA § 408(b)(3)
loan exception from the ERISA § 406 prohibited transaction rules is available only for
employee stock ownership plans and not for other plans (including, presumably, "con-
ventional" stock bonus plans). ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (Supp.
1975), prohibits transactions constituting a direct or indirect extension of credit between
a plan and a party in interest.
The approval of these leveraged purchases ties in with the exemptions from the
diversification requirement, the inapplicability of the 10 percent limit on investments in
employer securities, and the approval of the trust's acquisition of qualifying employer
securities from parties in interest. See ERISA §§ 404(a)(2), 407(b)(1), 407(d)(3)(A), 408(e),
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1104(a)(2), 1107(b)(1), l107(d)(3)(A), 1108(e) (Supp. 1975). These special
provisions show that Congress recognized the nature of employee stock ownership plans
as incentive programs which may benefit both employees and their employers. Thus the
provisions designed to minimize investment risks do not apply, to the extreme that
ESOT's may leverage their purchases of employer stock to the hilt. Apparently Congress
felt that the employer's commitment to make continuing contributions to the trust
(which is a necessary part of leveraged purchases, see note 37 supra) justifies the in-
creased risk involved with the use of leverage. Financing the ESOT purchase with bor-
rowed funds makes the corporation's credit available to the employees, allowing employees
immediately to obtain a substantial equity interest on a non-recourse basis.
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cial scrutiny by the Department of Labor and Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to ensure that they primarily benefit the plan participants and
beneficiaries. 44
B. Potential Advantages of the ESOT Purchase
The eventual disposition of close corporation stock will be a major
estate planning problem when such stock is a significant asset in an
individual's portfolio. The planning generally will have several basic
goals:45 (1) the conversion of at least some portion of the stock into
cash that provides liquidity and increased investment flexibility for
the individual and his heirs; (2) the determination of the stock value
for gift or estate tax purposes so as to avoid controversy between the
shareholder or his executor and the Internal Revenue Service;4 6 and
(3) the maintenance of continuity in the close corporation's business.
To be sure, the ESOT purchase is not the approach for disposing
of close corporation stock in every situation. The shareholders may
abhor the idea of employee ownership participation. The costs of es-
tablishing and maintaining a qualified stock bonus or employee stock
ownership plan may be substantial. And the company payroll may
not be large enough to permit sufficient deductible contributions to
the trust, since contributions may generally not exceed 15 percent of
payroll. But in many cases the ESOT purchase may be superior to
other estate planning alternatives for the disposition of close corpora-
tion stock.
Traditional estate planning approaches for the disposition of close
corporation stock consist of "outside" and "inside" sales. The share-
holder may sell stock to parties outside the close corporation, through
either a public offering or negotiations with a single entity such as a
competitor or a diversified public corporation. Alternatively, the share-
holder may arrange the future sale within the present shareholder
group by means of either a cross-purchase plan (in which the other
shareholders individually agree to purchase shares) or a stock redemp-
tion plan (in which the close corporation itself agrees to purchase its
44. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 313 (1974).
45. See D. WEsTFALL, ESTATE PLANNING PROBLEMS 470 (1973).
46. The value of stock for estate or gift tax purposes is the fair market value per
share on the applicable valuation date. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(a), 25.2512-2(a) (1958).
Disputes over valuation of stock in closely held corporations are frequent sources of litiga-
tion. See 2 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 944 n.13 (3d ed. 1961), 1912-28 (1974 Supp.)
(collecting cases).
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shares). In either of the latter cases, the terms of the plan typically
are established in a mandatory buy-out agreement. 47
Although the ESOT must operate as an independent legal entity,
the problems normally associated with sales to other outside parties
are minimized. Unlike a public offering of the company stock, the
sale to the ESOT does not require registration of the securities. 4S The
ESOT purchase does not require the shift in control of the corpora-
tion that may be an undesirable4 9 prerequisite to an acquisition by
an outside corporation or individual, because the selling shareholders
can both determine the number of shares they sell and choose a co-
operative, though independent, trustee.50 Most importantly, the pres-
ence of the in-house ESOT market solves the marketability problem
that usually plagues shareholders, especially minority shareholders, of
closely held corporations.
The ESOT purchase arrangement may have significant advantages
over conventional inside sales. The corporation's ability to finance the
purchase with pretax earnings reduces the cost of the ESOT purchase
in most cases below the cost of a stock redemption or cross-purchase. 51
47. See D. NVESTFALL, ESTATE PLANNING PROBLEMS 470 (1973); 2 A. CASNER, ESTATE
PLANNING 978-85 (3d ed. 1961); Kahn, Mandatory Buy-Out Agreements For Stock of
Closely Held Corporations, 68 MiCn. L. REv. 1, 2 (1969).
48. The sale of close corporation stock to the plan trustee should be within the exemp-
tion of Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970), as a transaction "by any
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." The selling shareholder is not an
"underwriter" in the ESOT purchase. This is because the transaction does not involve a
"distribution." See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(I1) (1970). Rather, it
constitutes a private sale to the representative of a narrowly limited class of individuals.
Requiring registration would add little (if any) protection for the employees, who are
fully protected by the adequate consideration requirement of ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1108(e) (Supp. 1975). In negotiating the purchase, a competent trustee will have both
access to all relevant information and the capacity to assimilate that information. Cf.
SEC Rule 146, 39 Fed. Reg. 15261 (1974). Any sales of close corporation stock distributed
from the ESOT will be in relatively small quantities on nonpublic markets. Whether or
not this is the case, the transaction generally will be exempt under other provisions of
the 1933 Act (e.g., the intrastate offering exemption of § 3(a)(l1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11)
(1970)).
49. See F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, ExPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS AssocIATEs:
"SQuEEzE-OUtrs" IN SMALL ENTERtREISES (1961).
50. The trustee of the ESOT should be a party independent from the corporation be-
cause of the potential conflicts in the interests of the controlling shareholders and the
ESOT beneficiaries and the responsibilities of plan fiduciaries. See, e.g., ERISA §§ 404,
406, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1104, 1106 (Supp. 1975). But the trustee in making his discretionary
decisions will normally cooperate with those who have put him in office. The trustee
will likely vote the stock held by the ESOT. But cf. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 91-12, § 301(d)(5) (Mar. 29, 1975) (requiring employee voting of stock held by em-
ployee stock ownership plans of corporations qualifying for elective 11 percent investment
credit).
The new shareholders resulting from the ESOT purchase likely will not oppose existing
management. And many corporations and shareholders will welcome employee participa-
tion even though corporate control may eventually shift into employee hands.
51. In the cross-purchase at least some portion of the purchase funds usually will be
taxable to both the corporation and the purchasing shareholders; the stock redemption
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The lower cost in turn makes it more likely that shareholders will
obtain full value for their stock; the shareholders can then avoid the
uncertainties of low purchase price buy-out agreements.52
The availability of the ESOT market alleviates the problem of de-
termining stock value for estate and gift tax purposes. Sales to the
ESOT by the decedent, his estate, or other shareholders within a rea-
sonable period before or after the shareholder's death will strongly
influence the estate tax valuation5 3 The ESOT purchase thus obviates
mandatory buy-out agreements designed to set a predetermined pur-
chase price. ESOT purchases may also solve the problem of disputes
over gift tax valuation of the stock.54
Since the ESOT, not the corporation, accumulates any amounts re-
quired for a planned purchase of a shareholder's stock, the ESOT
purchase approach avoids the accumulated earnings tax 5 problem
is therefore the more popular plan. See Kahn, supra note 47, at 11, 13-14. Even the stock
redemption plan requires that nearly two dollars be earned (assuming a 48 percent
corporate tax rate, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11) for each dollar to be paid out to the
selling shareholder or his estate. Life insurance funding does not solve the cost problem
since the premiums are not deductible. Id. § 264(a)(I). Furthermore, the cost of main-
taining term life insurance over a long period of time may be prohibitive. Kahn, supra
note 47, at 26.
52. If the corporation and the other shareholders cannot finance the acquisition at
full value, a shareholder may agree to sell or to have his executor sell at a low price. The
low price may represent a gift to the remaining shareholders. Alternatively, if other share-
holders are entering similar agreements requiring future sales of their own stock, the low
price may reflect a gamble in which each shareholder hopes to outlast the other share-
holders in order to win what amounts to a tontine. If the agreement's low price fixes the
estate tax value, the decreased estate tax liability will partially offset the loss on such a
below-value sale.
53. Sales to an ESOT representing employees outside the selling shareholder's family
are by their nature arm's length transactions for adequate consideration, and the price
on such sales will be persuasive for estate tax valuation. But if many of the ESOT's
participating employees are related to the selling shareholders there may be a gift ele-
ment in the sale, and the sale price may not determine the estate tax valuation. If the
shareholder is a key employee whose death diminishes the corporation's value, his estate
may assert that sales during his lifetime do not reflect this loss.
54. Cross-purchase and stock redemption agreements must establish the value of the
stock for estate tax purposes in order to avoid both wasteful valuation disputes with the
IRS and the disaster of an estate tax assessment based upon an amount greater than that
which the estate actually receives for the stock. To make the purchase price determinative
for estate tax purposes, the agreement must be an arm's length bargain that restricts
the shareholder's transfer of the stock during his life and obligates his estate to sell after
his death. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958); C. LOWNDES & R. KAMER, FEDEM.AL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 485-89 (2d ed. 1962); Kahn, supra note 47, at 5-6. Selling share-
holders therefore must submit to the imposition of possibly undesirable restrictions on
the transferability of their stock.
But even the use of these inflexible agreements does not foreclose the possibility of a
valuation dispute. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958). And an agreement having effect
at the shareholder's death does not determine the value of the stock for gift tax purposes.
See Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. McCann, 146
F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1944); Krauss v. United States, 140 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1944). Howe~er,
ESOT purchases may establish a "fair market value" figure that allows shareholders to
make gifts of other shares without fear of an unexpectedly high gift tax assessment.
55. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-37.
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confronting stock redemption plans. 6 State corporate law restrictions
on a corporation's purchase of its own shares57 similarly are not a
problem.
Perhaps the most important advantage of the ESOT purchase for
purposes of estate planning is the tax treatment of the selling share-
holder. The Internal Revenue Service, in private letter rulings, has
accepted the view that the shareholder's sale to the ESOT should be
treated for income tax purposes as a sale rather than as a redemption
by the corporation."s If the Service maintains this view, the share-
holder can sell to the ESOT any number of shares of stock during his
lifetime, allowing him both to diversify his investment portfolio and
to realize a portion of his interest in the corporation at capital gains
rates without the necessity of significantly diminishing his interest in
the corporation. Furthermore, if shares remain in the shareholder's
estate, his executor or legatee can sell stock to the ESOT at little if
any income tax cost.50
Despite the private letter rulings on this question, caution is still
in order; the IRS has not taken a position publicly with respect to
the taxation of shareholder sales to the ESOT. The tax treatment of
the selling shareholder may therefore be subject to dispute, even when
the employees participating in the ESOT are unrelated to the selling
shareholder. 0 The IRS might contend that the ESOT is a mere con-
duit or strawman used to funnel disguised dividends to the shareholder
and that the shareholder should therefore be taxed on those divi-
56. The question of the applicability of the accumulated earnings tax to accumulations
for future stock redemptions is unsettled. See B. BITTXKER & J. EusiIcE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAuATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS [ 8.07, at 8-25 to 8-26; Kahn, supra note
47, at 22. Compare Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958) (surtax applied to accumulations for redemption of 80 percent
interest) with Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th
Cir. 1960).
The corporation cannot avoid the accumulated earnings tax problem by purchasing
ordinary or "whole" life insurance (life insurance with a cash surrender value) on the
shareholder's life to fund the purchase of his stock at his death, since the policy's cash
surrender value is treated like any other investment or savings account of the corporation.
Sec Kahn, supra note 47, at 25-26.
57. See Kahn, supra note 47, at 46-51; Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Sub-
slantial Interest in a Closely Held Business (pt. III), 46 IOWA L. REV. 516, 523-25 (1961).
58. Menke, supra note 5, at 35; Blackman, supra note 5, at 277. Since the ESOT (and
not the corporation) acquires the stock, the ESOT purchase does not fit the statutory
definition of a redemption of stock. See INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 317(b).
Taxation as a sale will generally mean capital gains treatment, whereas characterization
as a stock redemption means that ordinary income tax rates are applicable unless the
redemption qualifies for capital gain taxation under the standards of id. §§ 302(a), 303, or
331(a)(2). For discussion of the taxation of amounts received in stock redemptions, see B.
BInxTER S. J. EUSTICE, supra note 56, 'r 9.01-.65.
59. This is because shares included in the shareholder's gross estate take a ."stepped-
up" basis at his death. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
60. The following discussion assumes that the selling shareholder and his family are
not among the participating emplo)ees.
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dends.61 Alternatively, the Service might argue that the ESOT pur-
chase transaction is in substance a stock redemption followed by the
corporation's contribution of the stock to the ESOT 0 2 and that the
transaction should be taxed accordingly. 63
Even if the Service advances these arguments, however, the taxpayer
should prevail. The ESOT does not act as a conduit or strawman to
pay disguised dividends to the selling shareholder in the ESOT pur-
chase transaction. An independent trustee 4 acquires the stock for the
beneficial ownership of, and eventual distribution to, the corporate
employees or their beneficiaries. 6 The ESOT has the valid business
purpose 6 of supplying work incentives and benefits to the corporate
employees, and must operate consistently with that purpose to main-
tain its qualified status. The ESOT therefore constitutes a separate
legal entity, not a conduit or strawman, under the tax law. 7
Although a direct redemption of the shareholder's stock followed
by the corporation's contribution of stock to the ESOT has the same
end result as the ESOT purchase transaction, the Commissioner has
61. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); John D. Gray, 56 T.C. 1032 (1971); E.
Keith Owens, 64 T.C. No. 1 (Apr. 2, 1975).
62. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (corporation's sale of
its sole asset called off at the last minute; the corporation was then liquidated and the
asset sold by the former shareholders individually; held, corporation taxable on gain
realized since the transaction was in substance the corporation's sale); Higgins v. Smith,
308 U.S. 473 (1940) (taxpayer's loss deduction on sale of stock to his wholly-owned
corporation disallowed); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
63. See note 58 supra.
64. See note 50 supra.
65. The shareholders cannot rely on the ESOT purchase and a subsequent redemption
from the ESOT to accomplish a gradual redemption of their stock. In such a scheme the
stock redemption from the ESOT would frustrate the purpose of the stock bonus or
employee stock ownership plan, thus disqualifying the ESOT. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-
1(b)(3) (1956).
66. Existence of some business activity or purpose strongly supports the recognition of
a separate legal entity for tax purposes. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319
U.S. 436, 439 (1943) ("so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is
followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a
separate taxable entity"). Cf. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of
Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 468-69 (1968) (noting Judge Hand's unvarying respect
for the corporate entity which has some nontax goal).
67. In Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 52 T.C. 888 (1969),
the taxpayers sold stock to trusts created for their children in exchange for installment
notes from the trusts, and were allowed to report the gain on their sale on the installment
basis under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453. In treating the trusts as separate entities, the
court emphasized the independent duties and responsibilities of the trustee. 441 F.2d at
597-98. Cf. Cromwell Corp., 43 T.C. 313 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 4 (newly
organized corporation respected as a separate legal entity when used in the leveraged
acquisition of an operating company to avoid dividend taxation to the new investors);
Arthur J. Kobacker, 37 T.C. 882 (1962), acquiesced in, 1964-2 Cuss. BULL. 6 (newly formed
corporation held not a sham or subterfuge on facts analogous to Cromwell Corp.); Milton
F. Priester, 38 T.C. 316 (1962) (corporation redeemed the shares of an individual investor
who had assumed the taxpayer's obligation to purchase those shares from the widow of
taxpayer's brother; held, no dividend to the taxpayer because the individual was an in-
vestor, not a strawman).
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no authority to reorder the ESOT purchase so as to create a transac-
tion taxable to the selling shareholder as a stock redemption. 68 Fur-
thermore, it is axiomatic that taxpayers can choose the method that
minimizes or altogether avoids tax in structuring their transactions, at
least so long as the transactions have some legitimate business pur-
pose."" In the stock redemption area the courts have generally held
that tax consequences follow the order of steps as set out by the parties
even though they might have accomplished the same end by following
a route that generates a higher tax liability.70 Although the share-
68. The step transaction doctrine requires that an integrated transaction not be
broken into independent steps in attaching tax consequences. See B. BiTrKEr 9 J. EusTIcE,
supra note 56, ff 1.05, at 1-19 to 1-20, 7 14.51, at 14-101 to 14-103. The doctrine looks to
the end of the chain of events; it does not seek to reorder the links in that chain. See id.
14.51, at 14-102. The ESOT purchase results in employee ownership of the purchased
shares. Assuming that the selling shareholder and his family members are not among the
participating employees, the ESOT purchase (as opposed to a stock redemption) creates
new ownership interests. A stock redemption would not result in new ownership interests
in the employees. Therefore, the step transaction doctrine does not support taxation as
a stock redemption since the end result, absent impermissible reordering of intermediate
steps, is not the same. Different considerations arise when the selling shareholder and, his
family are participating employees in the ESOT. See p. 1537 infra.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 456 (1950)(different tax consequences follow different methods of structuring transactions); Helver-
ing v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (1934) (per L. Hand, J.), a!f'd, Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465, 469 (1935) ("Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there
is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes...").
70. In so-called "bootstrap acquisitions" of stock, tax treatment of both buyers and
sellers depends upon the order established by the parties. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d
914 (6th Cir. 1954), acquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 745, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 223; Rev. Rul. 608,
1969-2 Cut. BULL. 43; Jassy, The Tax Treatment of Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions: The
Redemption Route vs. the Dividend Route, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1459 (1974). Compare Wall
v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) and Television Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner,
284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960) with Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952), acquiesced in, 1953-1
Cum. BULL. 4.
In leveraged purchase transactions, where the corporation serves as a guarantor of the
ESOT's promissory note, the corporation's secondary liability generally is irrelevant, since
tax consequences attach on the basis of the parties' primary liabilities to make payments.
See Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952) (buyer's secondary liability irrelevant in bootstrap
acquisition); Rev. Rul. 608, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 43. Consequently, when the corporation
assumes the purchasing shareholder's (ESOT's) liability to the lender upon a default by
the ESOT, a constructive dividend, if uncovered, is taxed to the purchaser (ESOT). See,
e.g., Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947); Lowenthal v. Commissioner, 169
F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1948); Maher v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'g 55
T.C. 441 (1970) (dividends result only as the corporation actually makes payments on the
purchaser's obligation). But the ESOT is a tax exempt entity under INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 501(a).
Taxpayers have donated close corporation stock to tax-exempt organizations and then
caused their corporations to redeem the donated stock for cash without incurring any
income tax liability, although taxable dividends would have resulted from a direct re-
demption from the taxpayers. See, e.g., Carrington v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 704 (5th
Cir. 1973), aff'g 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 950 (1971); Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 241
(2d Cir. 1973), aff'g 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 387 (1972); cf. Sheppard v. United States, 361
F.2d 972 (Ct. Cl. 1966). INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 4941 imposes a penalty tax on sales or
exchanges of property between "private foundations" and "disqualified persons" (defined
by § 4946 to include certain individual and corporate contributors and related persons).
However, the definition of "private foundation" does not include qualified employee
trusts, which are tax-exempt under § 501(a) rather than § 501(c). See id. § 509.
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holder's corporation controls the establishment of the ESOT and may
initiate any ESOT purchases, the purchase transaction itself represents
an arm's length bargain 7 ' that the IRS cannot rearrange after the fact.7"
The ESOT purchase may be compared with an ordinary sale of stock
from a shareholder to corporate employees. In such a case, the share-
holder generally would receive capital gains treatment, even though
the employees use cash provided by the corporation (their salaries) to
pay for the stock. The ESOT purchase arrangement differs from the
ordinary sale in three respects: (1) the employees do not directly con-
trol the purchase decision; (2) a trust holds the purchased stock;73 and
(3) taxation of income to the employees is deferred. Both the status of
employees as "captive" purchasers, and the holding in trust of the
assets of qualified plans, are authorized by the Internal Revenue Code
and ERISA.7 4 The deferral of taxation to the employees is provided
by Internal Revenue Code § 402(a)(1). Thus, the features distinguish-
ing the ESOT purchase from the ordinary sale of stock from share-
holder to employees are expressly authorized under provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code and in large part benefit the employees, not
the selling shareholder or the employer corporation. There is thus little
basis for different tax treatment of the selling shareholder in the two
transactions.
Taxation of the shareholder's sale to the ESOT as the sale of a capital
asset is consistent with the basic structure of the Internal Revenue
Code.7z The purchase funds come from tax-deductible compensation
paid to the employees who are eventually taxed with respect to those
compensation payments. The selling shareholder is subject to capital
gains taxation on the transfer for value of his claims to both the un-
distributed and future earnings and profits of the corporation; the
new shareholders or their transferees are subject to taxation on the
eventual distribution of those earnings and profits. Consequently, the
71. See ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(e) (Supp. 1975).
72. The Commissioner generally lacks authority to recharacterize arm's length transac-
tions between the selling shareholder and an unrelated purchaser. See Chirelstein, supra
note 66, at 469-70; cf. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965) (seller received capital
gain treatment in arm's length sale to tax-exempt organization); note 68 supra.
73. In addition, vesting of each individual employee's interest in the ESOT may be
postponed. See ERISA § 1012, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 411(a)(2). However, the corpora-
tion's contributions to the ESOT are irrevocable. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3)(iv) (1956);
Rev. Rul. 149, 1971-1 Cur. BULL. 118.
74. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § l103(a) (Supp. 1975). See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
40 1(a).
75. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 304, does not apply to the ESOT purchase transaction
because the ESOT cannot under the statutes be considered a "corporation." Cf. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-4 (1960) (distinguishing between entities recognized as trusts and those
that are associations taxable as corporations).
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Service should continue to accept the view that the shareholder's sale
to the ESOT is taxable as a sale rather than as a redemption by the
corporation.
IL Problems in the Use of the ESOT as an
Estate Planning Device
The previous discussion has assumed both that the shareholder sold
unrestricted common stock to the ESOT and that the employees par-
ticipating in the stock bonus or employee stock ownership plan did
not include the selling shareholder or members of his family.7 6 When
these assumptions are inapplicable, however, the previous conclusions
with regard to the qualified status of the ESOT and the tax treatment
of the shareholder selling stock to the ESOT are thrown into question.
A. Restrictions on the Stock Acquired by the ESOT
The shareholders of the closely held corporation may be quite will-
ing to bestow stock ownership on individuals who are closely connected
with the business, and thus the idea of employee ownership participa-
tion may appeal to them. But they may not want to extend stock
ownership or elements of corporate control beyond the company group
consisting of the employees and existing shareholders. In many situa-
tions there will be practical reasons that alleviate this concern; fre-
quently the ESOT's participating employees or their beneficiaries will
want to sell the stock distributed to them back to the ESOT. For ex-
ample, on receipt of the stock, they will be faced with an immediate
tax liability with respect to the stock distribution 77 and a need for
cash with which to pay the tax. Furthermore, they may not want to
hold for investment stock which produces little or no dividend income
and for which there is no willing buyer other than the ESOT.
Shareholders may desire additional assurances (for what may be en-
tirely legitimate business reasons) that stock ownership and corporate
control will remain in the hands of those close to the business. Con-
sequently, the shareholders prior to the ESOT purchase may either
impose restrictions on the transferability of the stock that is to be
passed to the ESOT, or create a class of nonvoting common or pre-
ferred stock for sale to the employee benefit trust. Either action may
cause problems concerning both the qualified status of the ESOT and
the taxation of the selling shareholder.
76. See note 60 supra.
77. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a).
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I. Transferability Restrictions
The Internal Revenue Service will likely object to any transaction
in which the ESOT acquires stock that cannot be sold to the highest
bidder after it is distributed to the employees or their beneficiaries.'-
The Service may also deny qualified status to the ESOT when the
stock bonus or employee stock ownership plan requires that the stock
be sold back to the ESOT immediately after distribution.,9 Thus the
shareholder and his corporation must be extremely careful in placing
any contractual restrictions on the participants' ability to market the
stock distributed to them. In addition, if the participants are required
to sell the distributed stock back to the trust soon after they receive
it, the ESOT purchase arrangement appears much more like a device
to pay disguised dividends to the selling shareholder. The Internal
Revenue Service could argue that such restrictions deny the employees
any real ownership rights and that there is no real sale of the stock
transferred to the ESOT.80
On the other hand, restrictions on the transferability of the stock
of closely held corporations are often considered beneficial to the cor-
poration and consequently may benefit all shareholders.8 ' Thus there
should be no prohibition of agreements among the shareholders (or
potential shareholders), including the employees, to offer their stock
first to members of the company group. Restricting outside transfers
does not deny any benefits to employees if the employees or their
beneficiaries are assured of receiving full value for those shares. The
shareholders therefore may be able to provide in the articles of in-
corporation a first refusal option8 2 to the corporation or its designee
78. In Rev. Rul. 372, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 256, 257, the IRS announced its "established
policy" to require that employer stock contributed to a qualified employee benefit trust
have "unrestricted marketability." That policy apparently derives from the exclusive-
benefit-of-employees rule.
Transferability restrictions which may depress fair market value of the stock must also
be considered in setting the price of stock to be purchased by the ESOT. See ERISA §
408(e)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(e) (Supp. 1975) (requirement of adequate consideration on
the sale).
79. The IRS has insisted that qualified stock bonus plans distribute only actual stock
of the employer and not other property having the same value as that employer stock.
See Rev. Rul. 256, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 118; Rev. Rul. 195, 1962-2 Cus. BULL. 125. Thus
the Service might object to devices that require distributees to sell shares back to the
" ESOT, contending that such distributees did not actually receive "stock."
80. See John D. Gray, 56 T.C. 1032 (1971); E. Keith Owens, 64 T.C. No. 1 (Apr. 2, 1975).
81. Devices such as shareholder agreements, voting, trusts, and first refusal options
are widely used to protect close corporations and their shareholders. See 2 F. O'NKXL,
CLOSE CORPOATIONS §§ 7.01-.29 (1958). Such devices may prevent the development of
irreconcilable conflicts among the shareholders, promoting harmony that is beneficial to
all concerned. See id. § 7.02, at 2-4.
82. For example, the option might give the corporation or its designee the right to
purchase the stock on a proposed outside sale at the outside offer price and on a proposed
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(viz, the ESOT) on any proposed outside transfers of the stock. This
limited restriction on transferability does not conflict with the pur-
poses of qualified stock bonus and employee stock ownership plans,
nor does it violate the exclusive-benefit-of-employees rule. Further-
more, it does not affect the tax treatment of the selling shareholder,
since imposition of a first refusal option is consistent with the posi-
tion of the ESOT participants as investorsS 3
2. Voting Restrictions
As long as the stock is held in trust, the problem of passing voting
control outside the company group (or those cooperative with that
group) does not present itself.8 4 Shareholders can keep corporate con-
trol in the hands of the company group after stock is distributed from
the ESOT by recapitalizing the corporation to create a class of non-
voting common or preferred stock for sale to the ESOT. In the sale
of such a potentially inferior class of stock to the ESOT, the seller
and the ESOT trustee must take great care to ensure that the adequate
consideration requirement of ERISA § 408(e)(1) is not violated.8 5 And
since the newly issued stock may constitute "section 306 stock,"8 gain
realized on its sale may be taxed as ordinary income to the selling share-
holder.8 7 Nevertheless, use of preferred stock may be a feasible means
of retaining voting control in the company group if the ESOT pur-
chases the stock from a shareholder's executor or legatees at its fair
market value.88
Full equity participation in the corporate enterprise, however, in-
volves sharing in the control and future growth (or demise) of the
business. Stock with a fixed rate of return or without voting rights
gives the employees only a limited proprietary interest. Although pre-
gift or bequest at fair market value. But given the position of the IRS in Rev. Rul. 372,
supra note 78, a cautious planner will seek a private ruling that such a. first refusal option
is permissible.
83. Compare Milton F. Priester, 38 T.C. 316 (1962) with John D. Gray, 56 T.C. 1032
(1971).
84. Cf. note 50 supra. However, if the ESOT holds corporate control, deductibility of
the contributions to the trust might be questioned. Cf. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner,
479 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973) (disallowing corporate charitable deductions for contributions
to controlling tax-exempt organizations).
85. Preferred stock with a secure rate of return may actually be more easily valued
than common stock; but unider present law the corporation cannot deduct the dividends
paid on such preferred stock.
86. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 306(c). However, neither preferred stock included in the
corporation's original capital structure nor nonvoting common stock are within the
definition.
87. Id. § 306(a)(1).
88. Stock included in a shareholder's estate loses any § 306 taint. Treas. Reg. §
1.306.3(e) (1955). Thus it could be sold to the ESOT at capital gain.
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ferred stock with a fixed rate of return may provide the employees a
more certain income source, the underlying purposes of stock bonus
or employee stock ownership plans are best fulfilled if the employees
have full equity participation. Congress might well provide that non-
voting common and preferred stock not exceed a certain share of an
ESOT's total assetssu
B. The ESOT as a Family Trust
Shareholders who are bona fide employees of a corporation may par-
ticipate in the corporation's qualified stock bonus or employee stock
ownership plan in the same manner as other employees. ° In some
closely held corporations, however, an ESOT may resemble a "family
trust" that principally benefits employees who are family members.
The Service could argue that, despite its formal compliance with the
statutory provisions for qualification, the family trust ESOT becomes
a subterfuge for the distribution of profits to the selling shareholder
in the ESOT purchase transaction. This would violate the regula-
tions,01 and the plan would lose its qualified status.
The "subterfuge" argument for disqualification of the family trust
has much force. Nevertheless, under the present law it probably will
not succeed. Given the general principle that shareholder-employees
can fully participate in nondiscriminatory qualified plans, any attack
on the qualified status of an ESOT in formal compliance with the
statutory provisions for qualification must focus on the peculiar effect
of the ESOT purchase transaction. The specific congressional approval
of ESOT purchases from parties in interest (including holders of 10
percent, or greater, interests in the employee benefit plan)92 precludes
such disqualification of a plan when the conditions of ERISA § 408(e)
are met.93
89. Congress apparently is aware of the problems presented by the use of preferred or
nonvoting common stock in employee stock ownership plans. Provisions of the Trade Act
of 1974 and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 granting special treatment for corporations
with employee stock ownership plans predicate the special treatment on the requirement
that those plans acquire only employer securities that are common stock with voting and
dividend rights no less than the corporation's other common stock. Trade Act of 197-1, §
273(f)(5)(C), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975); Tax Reduction Act of 1975, § 301(d)(9)(A), Pub. L. No.
94-12 (Mar. 29, 1975).
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1956); Rev. Rul. 421, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 59, 65.
91. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1956).
92. See ERISA § 3(14)(H), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(14)(H) (Snpp. 1975).
93. An ESOT purchase transaction within ERISA § 408(e) does not violate the ex-
clusive-benefit-of-employees requirement. See note 32 supra. A plan may become dis-
criminatory because of the disposition of forfeitures, but this is a possibility with all types
of qualified employee benefit plans. See IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(4); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-7 (1963).
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It also is difficult to find a statutory basis for taxing a constructive
dividend to the selling shareholder in the sale to the family trust
ESOT, even though the transaction effects no shift of stock outside
the family circle. For example, the constructive ownership rules of
§ 31894 do not attribute to the ESOT beneficiaries constructive owner-
ship of the shares held by the trust95 It thus seems immaterial that
the shares sold to the ESOT remain in the family or, indeed, in the
seller's beneficial ownership. Moreover, the general rule is that an in-
dividual may sell property to a related entity in an arm's length trans-
action at capital gain.9
The Service may nonetheless apply nonstatutory principles of con-
structive ownership 97 to tax a constructive dividend to the selling share-
holder.9s This approach 0 would treat as dividends amounts received
with respect to any purchased shares returned to the beneficial owner-
ship of the seller or his family.' 00 If the selling shareholder is himself
an ESOT participant, constructive dividend treatment of amounts re-
ceived in payment for those shares allocated to the seller's ESOT ac-
count becomes particularly appropriate. 10 1
94. There are several sets of constructive ownership rules in the Internal Revenue
Code. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1563(e)(3)(C) (no attribution from § 401(a) trusts); §§
267(c)(l), 544(a)(1) (stock owned by trusts considered as owned proportionately by trust
beneficiaries). Those found in § 318 are the rules applicable in the context of corporate
distributions (which are here involved). See, e.g., id. § 302(c)(1).
95. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a)(2)(B)(i).
96. See B. BIrKER & J. EusTce, supra note 56, ir 7.05, at 7-23. The rule is subject to
limited exceptions (e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239), none of which are applicable
here. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 52 T.C. 888 (1969).
97. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (held that taxpayer continued
to be owner of property he transferred to a trust which he dominated); Higgins v. Smith,
308 U.S. 473 (1940) (nonstatutory principle of constructive ownership applied to deny loss
deduction on shareholder's sale to his wholly owned corporation); Commissioner v.
Laughton, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
98. Since dividend distributions are not deductible by the corporation, the constructive
dividend treatment results in disallowance of the corporation's deduction for funds
transferred to the ESOT. Cf. Rev. Rul. 658, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 119 (corporation's deduc-
tion for charitable contribution to shareholder's private charity disallowed, since contri-
bution was constructive dividend to shareholder).
99. The IRS may take this position in advance rulings. This would have a substantial
deterrent effect on sales to family trust ESOT's whether or not the position prevails in
court.
100. The § 318 constructive ownership rules may hamper this approach. See note 94
supra. Even though the § 318 rules are particularly relevant in the taxation of corporate
distributions, however, they do not expressly apply in connection with dividend distribu-
tions which do not involve stock redemptions. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301. Compare§ 301 with § 302(c)(1).
101. In such a case the selling shareholder retains ownership (albeit beneficial owner-
ship) of the shares allocated to his account in the ESOT. The end result is that the
shareholder receives a corporate distribution with respect to those shares. In this situation,.
the step transaction doctrine, which looks to the end result of the steps in an integrated
transaction, supports taxation of that distribution under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301.
See note 68 supra; cf. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
The family trust ESOT here serves, at least in part, as a conduit to funnel to the sell-
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A more dependable approach for attacking the family trust ESOT
(and one with a definite statutory basis) focuses on the reasonableness
of the total compensation paid to employees. Corporate deductions
for contributions to qualified trusts are subject to reasonable compen-
sation limits; the ESOT contributions on an employee's behalf are
considered together with other compensation in determining their
reasonableness. 10 2 Therefore both salaries and ESOT contributions on
behalf of shareholder-employees and their family members can be
subjected to special scrutiny, and any "unreasonable" payments may
be recharacterized as constructive dividends10 3 without importing the
uncertainties of application of the common law constructive ownership
approach.
It is not easy to justify complete avoidance of dividend treatment
with respect to sales of stock by shareholder-employees to family trust
ESOT's. Although such transactions may promote some arguably de-
sirable ends (for example, the prevention of conglomerate takeovers
and the preservation of productive capital in close corporations), im-
portant goals of Congress in favoring ESOT's are not served. Specifi-
cally, family trust ESOT's create no new incentives to employee effi-
ciency; capital ownership is not expanded; and employees and their
families gain no new income source. The family trust problem is ag-
gravated by the fact that the stock held by the ESOT may be beyond
the estate tax.'04 The shareholder's sale of stock to a family trust ESOT
therefore may result in an unwarranted extension of extraordinary
tax benefits to the shareholders of family corporations. This problem
should enliven the concern of Congress and the Service.
Conclusion
In many situations the ESOT purchase arrangement is an attractive
approach for the shareholder's disposition of close corporation stock,
providing a means for the corporation to fund the stock purchase
ing shareholder dividends disguised as part of the purchase price paid by the ESOT for
the stock. A constructive dividend might be taxed to the seller on this theory. See John
D. Gray, 56 T.C. 1032 (1971); E. Keith Owens, 64 T.C. No. I (Apr. 2, 1975).
102. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-l(b) (1956).
103. See B. BIT=ER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 56, f 7.05, at 7-32 to 7-33. See, e.g., Paul E.
Kummer Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1975).
"Reasonable" salaries paid to shareholder-employees and their family members who are
corporate employees are deductible by the corporation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162
(a) (I). To the extent that these salaries are deductible, the two-tiered system of taxation
of corporations and shareholders is avoided. When shareholder-employees establish and
participate in qualified employee benefit plans, the two-tiered system is avoided in the
same manner, with the additional benefit of a deferral of tax liability by virtue of §
402 with respect to compensation payments made to the qualified trust.
104. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c). The estate tax exclusion has no apparent
policy justification. See Note, Employee Death Benefits, 26 TAx L. REv. 329, 353-56 (1971).
1538
Vol. 84: 1519, 1975
Employee Stock Ownership Trusts
with tax-deductible dollars while avoiding most of the principal prob-
lems surrounding other estate planning alternatives. The establishment
of the trust under a qualified stock bonus or employee stock owner-
ship plan solves the basic estate planning problems of the shareholders
of closely held corporations by creating an in-house market for the
close corporation stock.
ESOT purchases of the corporation's common stock for corporate
employees who are outside the selling shareholder's family also fulfill
the policy objectives underlying the favorable tax treatment of these
transactions. But the same conclusion may not follow when the ESOT
acquires preferred or nonvoting stock, since the employees then re-
ceive only a limited equity interest in the employer corporation. More
serious than this problem, however, is the fact that the ESOT may be
used as a family trust that furnishes a means for unjustified tax avoid-
ance in many close corporations. It would be appropriate for the
IRS and the courts to apply constructive ownership or reasonable com-
pensation concepts in such cases to prevent circumvention of the tax
structure applicable to corporations and shareholders.
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